Ownership Work and Work Ownership by Hafiz, Hiba
Boston College Law School 
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School 
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers 
3-30-2020 
Ownership Work and Work Ownership 
Hiba Hafiz 
Boston College Law School, hiba.hafiz@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Property 
Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hiba Hafiz. "Ownership Work and Work Ownership." University of Chicago Law Review Online (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
6/2/2020 Ownership Work and Work Ownership by Hiba Hafiz – The University of Chicago Law Review Online
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/03/30/ownership-work-and-work-ownership-by-hiba-hafiz/ 1/13
POST
Ownership Work and Work Ownership by Hiba Ha z
Professor Lee Fennell’s groundbreaking Slices and Lumps incisively reconceptualizes how the gig
—or “slicing”—economy impacts the structuring of work. But it goes even further to alert us to how
“delumping the working experience” (p 6) can transform the infrastructure of work, from an
individual’s task design to the agglomeration costs and benefits of untying and retying workers to
desks, work to benefits, and worksites to surrounding communities. This Essay takes seriously her
invitation to refine and adapt its insights to radically readjust work law in two ways. First, it explores
how employers’ property rights over worksites are “lumpy” when they allow employer accrual of
“opportunity cost” rents by: (1) exploiting “lumpy” benefits of first possession and the unilateral right
to exclude to reduce output, increase prices to consumers, or restrict workers’ more innovative and
productive property use, thereby foreclosing alternative, more productive uses of worksites; and
(2) foreclosing workers’ receipt of competitive wages or higher productivity contributions in
alternative employment by exercising labor market power over them (Part I). Second, this Essay
explores creative solutions for tackling the inefficiencies or social costs resulting from those rents.
Specifically, it re-envisions labor law doctrine pertaining to workers’ lawful interference with
employers’ property, which requires balancing employers’ state law property rights against
employees’ and unions’ labor rights under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”)
(Part II). Inspired by Professor Fennell’s contributions, it proposes a rebalancing of both sides of the
ledger: on the state property rights side, it calls for an efficiency-based “slicing” of employers’
property control (“ownership work”) (Part II.A), and on the labor rights side, redesigning a new
“choice architecture” that enables a broader set of options for workers’ protected activity to
function as countervailing power against employer rent collection (“work ownership”) (Part II.B).
Concentrating on the “slicing” economy’s impact on the structuring of work, Professor Fennell
“explores how new business models that slice time, effort, attention, and risk in unprecedented
ways are changing how people work,” not least through the gig economy’s “decoupling work from
many of its standard accompaniments, including health insurance” (p 6) As a result, “[c]hanging
ways of working may require new assemblages of risk pools that stand outside of the traditional
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employment model—. . . new forms of lumping as well as slicing” (p 131) For example, “many jobs
feature temporal indivisibility coupled with temporal immobility or fixity in that they occupy fixed
and contiguous lumps of time within the worker’s schedule. . . . Temporal indivisibility and fixity are
logically separable—a task could require eight consecutive hours of work that could be completed
at any time” (p 120) Employers may cause indivisibilities and rigidities at work—hiring employees
for work supplied in “lumpy” configurations or not at all to maximize revenue, minimize shirking,
and reduce turnover costs (p 121). As with work-time, so with work-sites. Law and culture can
establish or remove barriers to make certain features of worksites more or less immutable. For
example, adapting the “theory of the firm” literature on make-or-buy firm decisions to “homemake-
or-outsource” decisions in housing complements (public parks, laundromats, libraries), Professor
Fennell highlights how contingent housing demands for “a fixed amount of space” are when the
private home sphere can shrink or expand to share or absorb amenities (p 158). Similarly for
workplaces: in a “slicing” economy, employers and workers can more cleanly delineate the
boundaries and expectations of workplace amenities depending on legal requirements and
cultural norms that fuel heterogeneous preferences but also opportunities for wage discrimination.
And work and work production functions are themselves “lumpy”: there are discontinuities and
non-linearities where work product may only be complete upon reaching certain thresholds or
when work outcomes “do not increase smoothly and proportionately in response to inputs” (p 12)
Achieving the right level of granularity so people can make meaningful contributions “manageable
enough to fit within the envelope of excess capacity that a particular person has available” requires
accommodation strategies. Professor Fennell notes that “the smaller the grains, the easier it is to fit
everything in” and that “[b]ulky time commitments . . . require more strategizing” (p 96)
While many have explored the question of who benefits from “lumping” and “slicing” work
arrangements, less explored are the legal conditions for the possibility of deciding aggregation and
disaggregation questions at work: How do legal defaults favor certain decision-makers over others
in decisions about combining and “slicing,” and why? For example, municipal legislative reforms
prohibiting “clopenings”—requiring the same workers to close and open a business—suggest that,
while employers had exclusively decided how to aggregate work time for scheduling employees,
government disaggregation of “closings” from “openings” may reduce employer control in ways
that the market was unable to, offering welfare benefits to workers and reducing externalities (such
as child care costs and sick workers). But where labor and employment law rules can be “lumpy” (p
25), Professor Fennell’s book suggests that “market-based models” mostly outpace legal reforms
as “delumping” engines (p 141). And as “delumping” engines, the market can be liberatory—
individual and collective abilities to “slice” work frees up scheduling flexibility and enables private
ordering that allows families, friends, and communities to realign temporal commitments in ways
most beneficial to them. But employers also take advantage of navigating and side-stepping
“liability cliffs” to displace the legal infrastructure and shift the status of “employees”—situated at
the acme of work protections—to “independent contractors” (p 191), “supervisors,” “domestic
workers,” and others, situated at their nadir.
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And the ground beneath both legally protected and unprotected workers is quite literally the
domain of state law property regimes that establish default lines of control through possessory
rights and rights to exclude. These default lines overlay a more profound current running through
Professor Fennell’s analyses of how traditional property rights can be more or less “sticky” when it
comes to “slicing” forces (p 157). Just as urban infrastructure is “lumpy”—a means for “realizing the
agglomeration benefits (and costs) that flow from the underlying clustering of complementary
activities in cities”(p 173)—so, too, is the infrastructure of work: it directs use to certain ends that are
hard to dismantle and redirect to other ends. But evidence of the decline of labor’s share of
income, labor market concentration, employer monopsony and oligopsony power, and employer
collusion suggest that the infrastructure of work—including its legal regulation—is currently
directed towards agglomeration benefits to capital and shareholders and has proven difficult to
redirect to worker or broader social gains. A core source of the “stickiness” is employers’ “lumpy”
property rights.
I. Employers and Opportunity Cost Rents
Professor Fennell’s book uncovers how “slicing” exposes a range of opportunity costs that arise
from the “lumpy” way we structure assets. For example, AirBnB uncovers the opportunity costs of
home usage relative to the possibility of fracturing any idle capacity into seemingly infinite
microtransaction rentals that expand opportunities for exploitation (pp 142–43). Crucially, however,
the potential for controlling when and where to reduce opportunity costs for more efficient or
exploitative uses is—absent legal reform—almost exclusively within the purview of property
owners. Professor Fennell imagines employer property owners facing
a larger standing workforce . . . com[ing] with a lower opportunity cost [to an employer] if
lower-priority tasks can be taken up during downtime (which may depend on the granularity
of those tasks) or if there are ways to reallocate workers across firm sectors that have
different cycles of high and low demand. In theory, a firm could contract out its workers to
another firm during slow periods, although administrative hurdles may make this avenue
impractical. (p 123).
“If the [employment] contract with the employer serves to get workers started on a task, then the
returns that employees internalize from finishing the entire project may carry them beyond the
agreed-upon hourly terms—even though most of the surplus goes to the employer” (p 122)
Employers can restructure work in “minutely divided segments”—“sliced” rather than “lumpy”
service inputs—displacing the “lumpy service requirement” presented by permanent employees to
temporary contracts made at various stages of a worker’s productive life, increasing and
decreasing an employer’s opportunity costs relative to other sources of labor inputs or substitute
capital (p 22). Such restructuring is subject to restraints on employers generated by worker
preferences regarding “increasing wage sequences” (p 135). Additionally, workplace restructuring
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has enabled “widespread participation in slicing markets,” but employer ownership preserves any
“tailoring [of] transactional unit[s]” to the employer as the “exclusive agenda setter” for worksite
productivity (or lack thereof) (p 142). While Professor Fennell outlines exit options for workers—
through “[p]olicies that help workers manage risk outside of traditional employment . . . to support
entrepreneurism and innovation” (p 132)—the impacts of wage penalties and worker resistance
within inefficient worksites is underexplored.
But Professor Fennell’s book does expand the framework from which to evaluate opportunity costs
beyond the value of the next-best use to property owners to costs that are more broadly suffered
with respect to overall welfare. To the extent it is more profitable to property owners to abstain
from a next-best-use but it is more costly to overall welfare for the next-best or other uses not to be
exploited (because of high transaction costs and/or externalities) (pp 64–79), I argue that property
owners should be viewed as gathering “opportunity cost” rents, or rents accrued by engaging in
personal-preference usage at the expense of alternative and more valuable usages for overall
welfare.
When employers exploit their first possession rights to unilaterally exclude others from worksites,
they can passively accrue opportunity cost rents from foreclosing alternative, more productive
uses. There are a couple circumstances where alternative uses could be more productive for
overall welfare (and therefore, the employer’s choice extracts an opportunity cost “rent”) when and
if the employer: (1) reduces output and increases prices to consumers or restricts workers’ more
innovative and productive use of the property; and (2) exploits its labor market power—whether
sourced in labor market concentration, search frictions, double-sided matching costs, information
asymmetries, heterogeneity, or anticompetitive conduct—to tie workers to sites of employment,
foreclosing worker receipt of more competitive wages or higher productivity through alternative
employment opportunities.
First, employers may exercise monopoly power or collude with competitors to reduce output and
increase prices in downstream product markets, appropriating rents at the expense of consumers
and resulting in deadweight loss. But there are also circumstances where workers could enhance
the efficiencies of employers’ otherwise idle or relatively unproductive capital—making it more
“productive” than it otherwise would be or increasing its value relative to its alternative next-best
uses, through increasing artificially suppressed output, innovation, or surplus labor above and
beyond employers’ receipt of returns on capital (a reclaimed “labor theory of value”). When these
circumstances occur, employers’ control of the property—their right to exclude higher outputs,
productivity, and a range of worker conduct—is “tragically lumpy” (p 74): the employer’s private
valuation falls short of the socially beneficial use. And “[t]here are efficiency gains from employing
all resources more fully . . . and achieving a tighter fit between what is required and what is
provided” (p 129)
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Likewise, when employers’ monopsony, oligopsony power, or anticompetitive conduct reduces
labor market competition through wage-fixing, no-poaching agreements, non-compete
agreements, or other restraints, they foreclose workers’ ability to receive compensation matching
their marginal revenue product, artificially limit workers’ outside options, and create under-, mis-, or
unemployment. Further, just as the “suitability of a particular dwelling for a particular household
depends not just on its structural features and location, but also on the surrounding regulatory and
market forces,” so too with particular workplaces and worksites (p 157). Workplaces depend on
amenities that nurture them from the outside, and employers extract benefits from these features,
whether through exploiting lower labor costs by squeezed intermediary suppliers in a fissured
economy, subsidization through government social safety net programs to maintain healthy
workforces, or exploitation of traditional gender roles in providing home care for children, elders,
and individuals with disabilities. Thus, the employer can extract rents by precluding higher social
value generation in order to preserve inefficient private valuation resulting from tying workers to
idle or underproductive worksites and taking advantage of externalities.
When an employer’s exclusion of employees “generates substantial negative externalities,
intervention by the state may be warranted,” and “[u]nderstanding the core challenges of
aggregation and division . . . will enable policy makers and entrepreneurs to improve the fit
between supply and demand” (p 120). The intervention of labor protections—altering workers’ “use
rights” or “modalities of access” (p 137)—could serve as a countervailing force to correct the
inefficiencies produced by the employer’s market power and make the property more productive
and socially valuable by increasing output or innovation. “Slicing” the employers’ ownership and
control of opportunity-cost rents—rents gained from controlling any and all next-best uses of
worksites—can allow workers to create new social value through innovative alternative uses.
“Lumps” and “slices” can recalibrate supply-demand and market efficiencies. By curating the
bundle of employers’ property rights and expanding workers’ choice architecture, we can construct
a more socially productive organization of work.
II. Labor Law’s Accounting: Employer Property Rights and
Employee Labor Rights
One of the most consequential intersections of property and workers’ rights is the doctrine
pertaining to workers’ lawful interference with employers’ property under labor law, whether in the
context of union access to workers on employer property, workers’ communications about
unionization at work, or worker strikes and picketing inside the worksite (“inside actions”) and
outside it. In determining when workers can intrude on employers’ use and enjoyment of their
property, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) and the courts take the property
grants at issue as fixed under state law and are tasked merely with balancing those rights, on the
one hand, against workers’ NLRA rights, on the other. Workers’ rights lose out to employers’ when
courts view their right to organize, access information about unionization in the workplace, and
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engage in concerted activity as subordinate in the balance to employers’ common law property
rights. But Professor Fennell’s book provides a framework and argument for radically reconceiving
both the employer’s and the employees’ side of that ledger: What if employers’ property rights are
themselves “lumpy” such that they include a range of exclusion rights that were inefficiently
allocated and should be “sliced” out by the law? And would expanding and “slicing” the “choice
architecture” of workers’ protected activity enable more efficient allocations of “lumpy” property
rights and enhance social welfare?
Applying Professor Fennell’s novel insights to labor law doctrine reveals that, in over- and
underestimating how to weigh both sides of the ledger, the Board and the courts may have
improperly balanced unions’ access to workers, workers’ inside actions, and other labor activities
relative to employers’ property rights. If employers receive rents from over-“lumpy” property rights,
instead of taking those rights as a given and balancing them with an arbitrarily narrow spectrum of
NLRA rights, the labor law could view the scope of the property rights themselves, even before
balancing, as “slice-able” to avoid inefficiencies, waste, and rents. And the law could reassess the
scope of workers’ protected activities to accord with a more thorough evaluation of how workers’
conduct may correct for those inefficiencies, waste, and rents, on the other side of the ledger.
Specifically, the choice-set architecture available to workers—in the form of protected activities to
organize and engage in concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA—could be reconceived in
tandem with reevaluating the scope of employers’ property rights. Just as antitrust law’s analysis of
anticompetitive property rights abuses—including patent abuses and FRAND licensing—can justify
and serve as a remedial basis for open-sourcing, shared use, equal access, and non-discrimination
duties, so in the labor context: “slicing” property rights can enable social welfare benefits through
granting workers “use rights” and “modalities of access” (pp 136–37) to employer’s property for
leafletting, discussing unionization, and engaging in a range of concerted activity that exercises
economic pressure through shared control of employer property. Slicing access to the workplace
may change our perception of the underlying property interest, revealing that “what is being
assembled is never really property but rather cooperation, which might be aggregated either to
put things together or break things apart” (p 44). Work can be seen as a mechanism for facilitating
coordination between capital and labor inputs that make it productive, and a failure to cooperate—
a strike—can be conceived either as a way of breaking apart an existing cooperation or of
revealing the cooperation as structurally tainted by employer rent-seeking. If “delumping” can
enhance efficiencies, work law can redefine the “proper unit of analysis” through a process of
“evaluative aggregation,” deciding how widely or narrowly to view when lines ought to be crossed
or standards met (p 191).
By reimagining the very property rules that cut through core labor law doctrines—or how property
rules can create or reinforce inefficient and socially harmful ownership rights—Professor Fennell’s
book provides the basis for reimagining labor law itself, enabling a more nuanced vision of how
work can generate better forms of cooperation. Thus, by better understanding the conceptual
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work done by the property rights regime granted to employers (“ownership work”), we can
reevaluate forms of “work ownership,” or mechanisms to ensure beneficial use rights and
modalities of access to workers.
A. Employer Property Rights and “Ownership Work”
Under current law, employers have a range of rights to exclude workers and union organizers from
their worksites. Courts have granted employers the right to restrict workers’ discussion of
unionization to non-work areas on non-working time and to limit employees’ right to solicit union
support in non-work areas if “necessary in order to maintain production or discipline.” Employers
can require captive-audience meetings about unionization on work time and presumptively
exclude union organizers and subcontracted workers—deemed “non-employees”—from informing
employees about unionization as long as such they have reasonable access to employees outside
an employer’s property. Employers can temporarily replace employees striking their unfair labor
practices and can permanently replace employees engaged in economic strikes for higher pay or
better working conditions. And they can fire workers for engaging in inside actions like sit-ins,
overtime strikes, partial strikes, or intermittent strikes. Employers decide in the first instance the
space of work—“which kinds of work are strongly complementary to having fixed work locations
and which are served as well or better by floating access” on cost-saving and space-saving
measures (p 125). And absent “for cause” restrictions in employment contracts, they can fire
employees at will (unless the firing constitutes discrimination for, interference with, or retaliation for
exercising labor and employment rights).
While employers’ property rights can be divided into various “sticks” in a bundle—physical
exclusion rights, regulatory rights, and hybrid physical-regulatory rights—the labor law has primarily
treated them as a “lumpy” right to exclude when weighing them on one side of the ledger, ignoring
opportunity cost rents employers can exploit, effectuated in part by excluding workers and unions
from their property, whether in organizing campaigns, during leafletting and strikes, through lock-
outs, or by replacing workers with less efficient workers (think The Replacements). Professor
Fennell’s book allows us to recognize that “lumpy” rights may be disaggregated to more clearly
view them as different types of rights, ones we can “slice.” Arranging “slices” “can carry quite
different valences depending on who controls its terms” (p 126). When employers exploit
opportunity cost rents by, for example, exercising buyer power over labor inputs or by
appropriating rents from discontinuities and non-linearities in work production (p 122), Board and
court “slicing” can readjust the components of control enabling those social welfare harms.
Professor Fennell’s book alerts us to the fact that there is nothing inherently efficient about existing
property rights allocations, and since we can “slice” them up, we can imagine other allocations that
could lead to different labor law outcomes. When employers exploit the existing property rights
regime to reach inefficient outcomes, reconceptualizing property rights allocations to shift the
balance from “lumpy” employer exclusionary rights to more flexible worker use rights and
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modalities of access could dramatically shift their relative bargaining power and lead to more
efficient outcomes.
In interpreting the scope of employers’ property rights, the Board and the courts can “slice” up
overinclusive bundles of rights through labor law preemption doctrines or traditional property law
doctrines. Under Garmon preemption, a state may not punish activity that is clearly or arguably
protected under federal labor law. Machinists preemption bars states from regulating conduct that
the NLRA deliberately leaves unregulated, intending it be left to the “free play of economic forces.”
The Board or the courts, in interpreting the scope of state property rights, could interpret them to
avoid a conflict with federal labor law or view the employer’s right to exclude as affirmatively
limited by Congress’s protection of employees’ Section 7 rights or intent to leave union or
employee conduct unregulated (and to ensure against trampling on First Amendment–protected
activity). Alternatively, the Board or the courts could interpret the scope of employers’ property
rights under traditional exceptions to the right to exclude, such as adverse possession and
necessity defenses.
B. Employees’ Labor Rights and “Work Ownership”
As Professor Fennell notes, “[t]he way the choice set is structured . . . can affect the efficiency of
the arrangement . . . . [S]ocial policy can greatly influence the choice sets that people encounter,”
so it may “be desirable to consciously structure choice sets to make them chunkier or less chunky.”
When workers exercise their labor rights to overcome inefficiencies or negative externalities from
employer rent-seeking, they should be viewed as “property outlaws” reclaiming “slices” of
worksites to make those worksites more productive and socially valuable than employers’
exclusion. Choice sets about workers’ use rights and modalities of access to employer property, or
“work ownership”—including mechanisms of exerting economic pressure to impact employers’ use
and enjoyment of property—should not be arbitrarily limited by labor law in ways that protect
employers’ less efficient or harmful use. Thus, in reviewing employees’ lawful interference with
employer’s property rights—whether as to speech on employer property or engagement in
concerted activity—the Board and courts should tailor the scope of protected interference in
accordance with the “equal bargaining power” purpose of the labor law, which ensures
employees’ countervailing power against their employer.
First, in overcoming employer intimidation and collective action problems to form a union or gain
support for a strike, “the choice to cooperate or defect in a situation involving an indivisible goal
depends on what one expects others to do” because “expectations are critical, anything that helps
to align (or disrupt) those expectations can influence the prospects for a cooperative, noncoercive
solution”—“salient features of the environment that can help parties land upon a cooperative
solution . . . are especially significant” (p 60). Workers’ ability to fully exercise their Section 7 rights
depends crucially on an open environment of communication, discussing the costs and benefits of
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unionization, at risk of discharge or other employer retaliation; “[s]ustained face-to-face contact
with employees is crucial in realizing” those rights and “is very difficult to arrange outside of the
workplace.” The labor law already “slices” property rights to overcome take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI)
employer offers for work and lodging through granting unions’ access rights to workers—for
example, in logging camps, mining camps, mountain resort hotels, and certain state and federal
law “slice” employer property rights to allow access to migrant worker camps. The First
Amendment also restrains property owner exclusions of state-protected rights of expression and
petitioning in privately owned shopping centers to which the public is invited. Thus, expanding
workers’ choices on when and where to communicate with each other and with non-employee
union organizers on employer property, including their ability to adequately respond after
employer captive-audience meetings, could justify under similar rationales “slicing” employers’
property rights to grant access rights that better ensure employees’ equal bargaining power with
their employer. This is particularly important where employers are entitled under labor law to make
TIOLIs about property uses in collective bargaining without any duty to bargain to impasse with
workers—for example, regarding corporate decisions to close plants or work-product decisions.
“Slicing” employer property rights is more justified in such circumstances because granting access
to those who could counsel employees on mechanisms of self-help is one of the least intrusive
means of ensuring equal bargaining power.
Finally, and most importantly, the choice architecture for protected concerted activity could be
modified on grounds that workers’ use or access to employer property are warranted to counter
employer rent-seeking. Many labor rights under current law are treated as “lumpy” rights. But
having a broad menu of concerted activity options can equalize relative bargaining power where
employers’ exploitation of opportunity cost rents—protected by property rights regimes—has
unduly shifted the balance in their favor. For example, only full strikes are protected under labor
law. Protecting “slices” of strikes like partial strikes (only performing certain tasks and not others) or
intermittent strikes (“quickie,” on-and-off strikes for portions of time) could be more effective in
equalizing bargaining power between employers and employees. A broader choice architecture is
all the more critical to protect inside actions where employers, making the original decisions on
“fixed” versus “floating” workplaces, may leave employees with no effective picket line outside of
inside action. Strike protections could also be “sliced” to allow minority and wildcat strikes at least
in part because strikes by a smaller set of workers—whether they be underrepresented in the
union or particularly necessary for the production process and more difficult to replace—could
make strikes more effective without subjecting as many workers to wage losses. Expanding the set
of choices available to employees on the other side of the ledger can provide the Board and the
courts a more precise mechanism for tailoring the NLRA’s protections so employees can assert
countervailing power against employers.
Granting slicing rights as protection for those with possessory interests is not unheard of in real
property law. A good example is constructive evictions: a lessee can withhold rent—failing to
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perform a contractual obligation—while remaining in their rental property if their landlord breaches
the implied warranty of habitability. Professor Fennell’s insight here—pointing out a parallel
between constructive evictions and partial strikes—was particularly helpful. Remedial doctrines like
constructive eviction that traverse the property/contract interface have been justified on
instrumental, redistributive, and humanitarian grounds, and they function as legal mechanisms for
slicing and realigning rigid property rules to accommodate overall welfare considerations. “Slicing”
strikes can likewise further overall welfare goals and ought to be protected accordingly.
Conclusion
Professor Fennell’s Slices and Lumps invites a reconfiguration of the infrastructure of work,
exposing inefficiencies and externalities created by the “lumpy” property rights regimes that
pervade its regulation. This Essay expands on her crucial work to consider ways in which we can
view employers’ property rights as creating opportunity cost rents, proposing that a new balance of
those rights with workers’ labor rights—through curated “slicing” of rights and protections on both
sides of the ledger—could avoid those inefficiencies and enhance social welfare.
 
Hiba Hafiz is an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. The author is grateful
to comments and questions from Lee Fennell, Brian Galle, Michael Pollack, and the participants of
the Symposium on Slices & Lumps: Division and Aggregation in Law and Life. She is especially
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